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ABSTRACT
 
This report documents the basic research, applied development, and other changes re­
quired to achieve a dramatic improvement in civil helicopter safety. Helicopter and fixed-wing 
accident data is reviewed and major accident causal factors are establishedi The impact of 
accidents on insurance rates is examined and the differences in fixed-wing and helicopter acci­
dent costs are discussed. The state of the art in civil helicopter safety is compared to military 
helicopters and goals are established based on incorporation of known technology and 
achievable improvements that require deveiopment as well as administrative-type changes 
such as the impact of improved operational planning, training, and human factors effects. 
Specific R&D recommendations are provided with an estimation of the payoffs, timing, and 
development costs. 
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FOREWORD
 
This report-was prepared by the Boeing Vertol Company for the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration' Langley Research Center, under NASA Contract NAS1-13624.. 
William Snyder was NASA technical monitor for this work. The-Boeing Vertol Project 
Manager was Wayne Wiesner. 
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SUMMARY
 
The purpose of this study was to identify safety improvements that require further re­
search and development. These recommended programs are defined with estimated costs. 
Some of the recommended research is directed toward identifying other research and develop­
ment programs that could not be defined within the scope of this report. Additional effort 
to define unsafe operational practices and aircraft features will require detailed analysis of 
accident investigation reports over the past 8 to 10 years. This study covered limited statisti­
cal trending and detailed analysis of US. civil helicopter accidents 'chat occurred in 1975, 
which was considered to be representative. 
In general, this study shows that there are many factors that affect civil helicopter safety 
and that an aggressive safety improvement program is required to reduce accidents and crash 
hazards to an acceptable level. Significant increases in numbers of helicopters and yearly 
flying hours are forecast in the next decade. A goal of a 62-percent reduction in accidents 
per 100,000 flying hours by 1985 was established and actions required to achieve this goal 
are identified. Many of the required actions are within existing technology and can be 
implemented immediately. 
In our judgment the application-of these existing technological safety improvements and 
recommended actions is more important than the longer-range research and development 
because of the immediate impact on safety and the effect on helicopter industry growth. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
 
This study was conducted -to define research and development needs togreatly improve 
civil helicopter safety in the next 8-year period. Included in the report are recommendations 
which Will result in reduced crash injuries and fatalities. The report-discusses the civil helicop­
ter safety issues and their cost in terms of high-insurance rates and other-associated costs of 
accidents such as loss of revenue, delays, lack of public confidence, and the depression of 'heli­
copter industry growth. 
Many-data sources were surveyed including published reports, Boeing Verto] safety data 
bank, operators, accident investigators, insurance companies, NTSB, HAA, and the military. 
It was decided to use current statistics from accidents occurring-in 1975 for general aviation 
and helicdpters. 1975 is the latest source available-and was similar to prior years. Accident 
rate trends are projectedito 1985. 
Changes needed-for improving civil helicopter safety are defined, the state'of the art is 
established, and technological gaps are identified. Specific programs for high-payoff future 
research are defined sufficiently for rough scheduling and cost-estimating purposes. An esti­
mation of-the probable impact of the recommended programs on'reducedaccident rate-and 
reduced injuries and fatalities is included., 
2.0 GOALS 
Civil helihopter accident records show a significant improvement over the past 7 years 
(Figure 1). Fixed-wing rates have also improved, but less rapidly than helicopters. The dra­
matic reduction in helicopter accident rate in the 8-year period 1968 to 1976 (from 41 to 16 
accidents/100,000 flight hours) can be attributed to several factors: mbre professionalism; 
increase in total flight hours; probably better flight hours reporting; a trend toward larger 
fleets with better pilot training and more planning and control of operations; improved com­
ponent reliability; and increased use of turbine power. 
A plot of U.S. Army accident rate trend data for FY 71-76 (Figure 1) is level at 
6.5/100,000 flight hours (this data is dominated by the UH-IH). The better rate for Army 
operations, 6.5 compared to 16 for civil helicopters, is probably because of more stringent 
control of flight operations than in general aviation and the fact that nearly 50 percent of the 
flying hours in general aviation are in older reciprocating-engine-powered helicopters (Table 1), 
whereas Army helicopters are nearly all turbine-powered. Other factors affecting the rates 
are differences in accident definition and more hazardous operation in civil helicopter agri­
cultural applications than in peacetime Army operations. 
With the probable continued influx of newer turbine-powered helicopters (including 
twins) in general aviation, a substantial reduction in accident rate can be expected. For 
example, Table 1 shows that civil turbine-powered helicopters have a rate of 9/100,000 flying 
hours.for 1976 compared to the overall rate of 16/100,000 flying hours. Given a continuing 
aggressive safety improvement program as outlined herein, a goal of 6.0 accidents/100,000 
flying hours appears attainable by 1985. 
This goal is based on Boeing Vertol experience with safety improvements achieved on 
military helicopters. Figure 2 depicts the cumulative accident rate trend of two generations 
of Boeing -Vertolhelicopters. This-experience-indicates-that-a 66 percent-reduction in-cci­
dent rate is attainable for subsequent generation helicopters. Since general aviation helicopters 
had a rate of 16/100,000 flight hours, a goal of 6/100,000 flight hours should be attainable, 
predicated on the fact that the present turbine-powered helicopters are at 9/100,000 flight hours. 
If a rate of 6.0 is achieved the corresponding fatal-accident rate is expected to continue 
at about 1.5 percent of the overall accident rate (Figure 3) of 0.9/100,000 flying hours. A 
further reduction could be achieved by retrofitting crashworthy features, but since these will 
probably be introduced only in newer models, there will not be a significant impact by 1985. 
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Figure 1. Trend of accidents with U.S. general aviation helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft 
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TABLE 1. U.S. dENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS IN 1975 
Prime 
,Causal Factors* 
Turbine-Powered Helicopters 
Model Fit Hr No. of Accidents : a . Rate per 100,000 Fit Hr 
Bell 206 (OH-58) 
FH 1100 
Bell 212 (Twin) 
Bell 205 (UH-1) 
Hughes 369 (OH-6) 
Alouette III (SA316B,319) 
Sud Avn SA341G 
Aeros3atiale SA315B 
SNIAS SA318C 
Sikorsky S-61 (Twin) 
469,833 
37,683 
41,410 
46,453 
91,701 
10,894 
17,766 
1,611 
17,344 
1,967 
36 
5 
4 
2 
20 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
6 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
18 
1 
1 
1 
11 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
7.66 
13.26 
9.65 
4.30 
21.81 
18.35 
11.25 
5.76 
-
736,662 74 13 7 35 10 
*Selected by 
Boeing Vertol Qo 
9 10.04 
No-Accident Models (Twin) 
BV 107 
83,887 0 0 
BO-105 
Sikorsky S-64 
Sikorsky S-58T 
Turbine-Powered Helicopters 820,549 
Turbine-Powered, Fixed-Wing 1,389,006 
74 
34 
9.02 (mostly single-eng) 
2.45 (mostly twin-eng) 
Total Turbine-Powered 2,209,555 108 4.89 
Recip-Engine Helicopters 
Recip-Engine Fixed-Wing 
735,526 
31,062,000 
219 
3,910 
29.77 
12.59 
Total Recip-Eng-Powered 31,797,526 4,129 12.99 
100 
90 
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~CH-46/CH-47 (TWIN-TURBINF POWERED) 
10 -
0 -
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
YEARS IN SERVICE 
Figure 2. Rate trends of major accidents 
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Figure 3. Trend of fatal accidents with U.S. general aviation helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft 
3.0 MAJOR ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
AND CAUSAL FACTORS 
3.1 General 
U.S. general aviation accidents and fatal-accident trends are shown in Figures 1 and 3 for 
helicopters versus fixed-wing aircraft. U.S. Army helicopter trends are also shown for com­
parison. Figure 4 shows accidents and fatal accidents for 1975 broken down to show the rates 
for destroyed and substantial damage, comparing helicopters to fixed-wing aircraft. Examina­
tion of the graphs reveals no significant difference between civil helicopters and fixed-wing 
accidents in terms of "destroyed" to "substantial damage" ratios. 
3.2 Distribution of Causal Factors 
A detailed analysis of all 293 helicopter accidents that occurred in 1975 was conducted 
to select prime causal factors. The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5. Also shown 
in Figure 5 are the distributions by flight purpose and phase of flight. A similar breakout for 
accidents with fatalities and serious injuries is shown in Figure 6. From these charts it can be 
seen that operations and material failures are more predominant as causal factors in fatal and 
serious accidents than they are overall. Nevertheless, the pilot is listed as the prime accident 
causal factor in over 50 percent of the helicopter accidents, with nearly half of these being 
"commercial" and occurring in cruise flight. We quote from HAA (ref. 1) as follows: 
"Pilotcause orfactoraccidentshistorically lead the list and this is the area 
that the greatestamountof accidentprevention efforts mutst be expended. 
Management andsupervision must share a largeportion of the responsibility 
for these accidentswhich generally resultfiorn a lack of knowledge, train­
ing, or skills. Thoroughand professionaltrainingwill reduce pilot cause or 
factor accidents." 
Pilots have suggested that the design-related workload may be the real causal factor and 
that the average pilot cannot handle it. A study of helicopter pilot errors versus fixed-wing 
pilot errors would help to resolve this. A detailed breakout of causal factors is covered in 
appropriate sections of this report. 
3.3 Fatal Accidents 
Table 2 lists the distribution of fatalities and serious injuries by personnel categories, 
i.e., pilot, copilot, crew, passengers, ate, for helicopter accidents in 1975. In 23 fatal accidents 
there were 46 fatalities, 20 aircraft were destroyed, and 10 had fire after impact. No informa­
tion was available in the published records as to the number of thermal injuries and fatalities. 
It is expected that U.S. Army experience with helicopters that did not have crashworthy fuel 
systems would offer guidance. In the Army case, a large percentage of the serious injuries and 
fatalities could be directly attributed to fire. 
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TABLE 2. ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES WITH U.S. GENERAL AVIATION 
. .. -HELICOPTERS IN 1975 
Fatal Serious 
Injuries 
Minor None -Total 
Pilot 
Copilot 
Dual Student 
20 
1 
25 
3 
46 
2 
2 
215 309 
3 
19 24 
6 
Check Pilot 
Flight Engineer 
Navigator 
Cabin Attendant 
Extra-Crew 
Passengers 
1 
24 
3 
19 
1 
3 
43 
1 
2 9 
161 247 
Total 46 50* 97 400 Aboard 596 
23 Fatal Accidents 31 Accidents With Serious Injury 
20 -Destroyed Helicopters 13 Destroyed Helicopters 
10 FireAfter Impact 5 Fire After Impact 
*7 serious-injuies in fatal accidents 
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In'31 serious-injury accidents, 43 occupants were seriously injured, 13 aircraft were 
destroyed, and 5 had fire after impact. There were also seven serious injuries in the-fatal 
accidents. 
Figure 7 shows a comparison of general aviation fixed-wing and helicopter cases of post­
crash fire. Conclusions from Table 2 and Figure 7 are as follows: 
1. 	 Out of 54 accidents with fatalities or serious injury, 15 (28 percent) had fire. 
2. 	 Eleven additional accidents in 1975 had fire but had no fatalities or-serious injuries. 
3. 	 In approximately 89 percent of accidents with fires, the aircraft was destroyed and 39 
percent had fatalities. Fixed-wing aircraft had approximately the same percentage 
destroyed as helicopters but 65 percent had fatalities. Fire occurrence in helicopters is 
1.6 times that of fixed-wing aircraft. 
4. 	 Some reduction in fatalities and serious injuries may be achieved by equipping civil 
helicopters with crashworthy fuel systems. 
3.4 Twin- Versus Single-Engine Aircraft 
The case for increased safety with twin-engined tactical aircraft is well-documented by 
the U.S. Navy Safety Center in reference 2, which states: 
"Conclusions. 1. This survey shows that the twin-engined tacticalaircraft 
has maintaineda dramaticsafety advantageover its single-enginedcounter­
part. Ofparticularsignificance is the ii umber of twin-engine aircraftcon
sideredas confirmed 'saves'attiibutableto tfhe aircr-aft's-redundant-. 
Spoverplants. TheodollarsaVingsdirectly attibutableto the twin-engine 
configurationare considerable." 
The trend curves plotted in Figure 8 also show a dramatic difference in accident rates 
between single-engined versus.multiengined civil fixed-wing aircraft. Admittedit, there are six 
times as many single-engined fixed-wing aircraft as there are multiengined, and multiengined 
aircraft fly twice as many hours per year, which probably means that longer missions at higher 
speeds are flown with fewer takeoffs and landings. The operational uses of single-engined 
civil airplanes may be more hazardous and pilot training is probably not as good as with the 
twin-engine airplane, which is more sophisticated. Normally, the multiengine rating is ob­
tained only after having built up several hundred flying hours in single-engine airplanes. 
Nevertheless, the facts are that the multiengined aircraft has only 42 percent of the accident 
rate of the single-engined fixed-wing aircraft. 
In the case of the helicopter, it is expected that pilot training for single and twin engines 
would be approximately the same, except where instrument ratings are involved. 
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Figure 7. Comparison of 1975 accidents with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft involving 
postcrash fire 
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Figure 8. Comparison of accident rates with single-engine and multiengine fixed-wing aircraft 
Although inconclusive because of the low number of flying hours, the five accidents in 
twinengined civil helicopters for 1975 in 125,297 flying hours result in a rate of 4.07/100,000 
flying hours. 
From the fixed-wing aircraft and limited helicopter statistics, it is concluded that civil 
helicopter accident rates will.be favorably impacted by increased use of twin engines. 
3.5 Turbine-Powered Aircraft 
The impact'of turbinepower on accident rates is shown in Tables 1 and 3-or 1975. 
Table 1 breaks out the turbine-powered helicopters and compares their rates with reciprocating 
engines. Table 3 shows similar comparative data for fatal acdidents. This data shows that ap­
proximately 53 percent of-the helicopter flying hours are with turbin'e power, with an acci­
dent rate of 9.02/100,000 flight hours,, compared to 29.77/100,000 hours for reciprocating 
engines. Comparable data for fixed-wing aircraft is: 4.3 percent of the fixed-wing flying 
hours are with turbine power with an accident rate of 2.45/100,000 flying hours, compared 
to 12.59/100,000 flying hours for reciprocating engines. 
Fatal accidents shown in Table 3 indicate that turbine-powered helicopters have a rate 
of 1.46/100,000 flying hours compared to reciprocating-engined helicopters at 1.49/100,000 
hours. The comparable fixed-wing-rates are 1.01/100,000 hours for turbine power and 
2.05/100,000 hours for reciprocating-engine power. 
In conclusion, turbine-powered, helicopters have one-third the-overall accident rate of 
reciprocating-engined helicopters but are nearly four times the fixed-wing aircraft rate. Fatal­
accident rates are about the same for turbine- or reciprocating-engine-powered helicopters, 
while turbine-powered fixed-wing aircraft have half the fatal-accident fate of the reciprocating­
engined fixed-wing aircraft. It is recognized that a major factor in these statistics is the dif­
ference in usage and accident hazards; therefore a.more detailed analysis of causal factors is 
necessary.
 
3.6 Pilot Causal Factors 
Table 4 is a breakout of the pilot causal factors as reported by the National Transporta­
tion Safety Board (NTSB) for 228 civil helicopter accidents in 1975. All pilot factors reported 
are ranked in terms of number of times reported. They are not necessarily prime causes, but 
frequently are contributing factors. For example, an autorotation because of fuel exhaustion 
may result in "failed to maintain rotor rpm," "mismanagement of fuel," and "inadequate 
preflight and planning" all being listed. 
The most numerous single reason for pilot-caused accidents is "failed to maintain rotor 
rpm," which occurs predominantly in landings; but a significant number also occur in takeoff 
and hover with occasional occurrences in cruise. The next two highest factors are "misjudged 
speed and alitude" and "improper operation of controls," which frequently are, listed along 
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TABLE.3. FATAL ACCIDENTSIN U.S. GENERAL AVIATION IN 1975
 
Turbine-Powered Helicopters 
Number Number Accident Rate/ 
Model FIt Hr of Accidents of Fatalities 100,000Flt.Hr 
Bell 206 469,833 7 15 1.48 
FH 1100 37,683 1 2 2.65 
Bell 212 41,410. 2 10 4.82 
Bell 205 46,453 1 1 2.15 
Hughes 369 91,701 1 3 1.09 
687,080 . 12 31 1.75 
Other Models (no fatal 
accidents) 133,469 0 0 
Turbine-Powered Helicopters 820,549 12 31 1.46 
Turbine-Powered Fixed-Wing 1,389,006' 14 57 1.01 
Total Turbine-Powered 2,209,555 26 88 1.18 
Recip-Eng-Powered 
Helicopters 735,526 11 15 1.49 
Recip-Eng Fixed-Wing 31,062,000 638 1,194 2.05 
Total Recip-Eng-Powered 31,797,526 649 1,209 2.04 
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TABLE 4. PILOT CAUSAL FACTORS IN ACCIDENTS WITH U.S. GENERAL
 
AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN 1975 
.-

Failed to maintain adequate rotor rpm 
Misjudged speed and altitude 
Improper operation of flight controls. 
Inadequate preflight preparation/plannina 
Failed to see/avoid objects or obstructions 
Misjudged altitude/clearance 
IVsmanagement of fuel 
Lack of familiarity with aircraft 
Diverted attention from operation of aircraft 
Improperin-flight decision/planning. 
Failed to follow approved procedures/directives 
Simulated conditions 
Inadequate supervision of flight 
Selected unsuitable terrain 
Attempted operation beyond experience/ability level 
Improper compensation for wind conditions 
Improper level-off 
Improper operation of powerplant and powerplant 
controls 
Pilot fatigue 
Exercised poor judgment 
Poorly planned approach 
Operation with known'deficiencies in equipment 
Continued VFR flight in adverse weather conditions 
Initiated flight in adverse weather conditions 
Lost/disoriented 
Failed to attain/maintain flying speed 
Misjudged speed, altitude, or clearance 
Failed to maintain directional control 
Spatial disorientation 
Delayed initiating go-around 
Delayedaction in aborting takeoff 
Percent 
(228 Accidents) 
61 26.8 
46 20.2 
45 19.7 
43 18.8 
36 15.8 
22 9.6 
21 9.2 
13 57 
12 5.3 
11 '4.8 
10 4.4 
10 4.4 
10 4.4 
9 4.0 
9 4.0 
7 3.1 
7 3.1 
6 2.6 
6 2.6 
5 2.2 
5 2.2 
4 1.8 
3 1.3 
3 1.3 
2 0,8 
2 0.8 
2 0.8 
2 0.8 
1 0.4 
1 ,0.4 
1 0.4 
Note: Many adcidents have more than one cause listed, therefore total percentage 
will exceed 100. 
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with "failed to maintain rotor rpm." Since these three factors are involved in most of the 
accidents involving autorotation, this area was studied as discussed below. 
3.6.1 Autorotational landing accidents (1975). - Reasons for autorotation are: 
29 reciprocating-engine failures 
16 fuel exhaustion 
6 fuel contamination 
7 turbine-engine failures 
3 other material failures 
18 practice autorotation 
79 total power-off autorotation accidents (27 percent of 293) 
This data shows clearly that causes for unplanned autorotation are predominantly re­
ciprocating-engine failures and fuel exhaustion or contamination. 
Turbine power, and twin turbines in particular, would greatly reduce the unplanned 
power-off autorotation hazard. Means to prevent fuel exhaustion and fuel contamination 
would also be of substantial benefit. 
Of the 79 accidents involving power-off autorotation, 66 had pilot causal factors as 
shown in Table 5. (Note that in some cases more than one factor was listed.) "Misjudged 
speed and altitude" (27), "failed to maintain adequate rotor rpm" (21), "improper operation 
of flight controls" (10), and "improper level-off" (5) account for a total of 62 entries listed 
for the pilot-causal-factor autorotational accidents. 
This data shows the need for improved pilot qualification and understanding of low-speed 
aerodynamic characteristics when flaring to a power-off autorotative landing. Since.unplanned 
autorotational-landings-are-a factof life and will continue to happen, improved training pro­
cedures appear to be necessary, together with design changes to make autorotational landings 
less hazardous and to reduce pilot workload. The fact that there were 18 practice autorotations 
and 61 unplanned autorotations that resulted in accidents in 1975 reinforces this conclusion. 
The development of flight simulators similar to those used by the U.S. Army at Fort Rucker, 
Alabama, to assist in pilot training for autorotation would appear to offer significant payoffs. 
Reciprocating-engine failures (1975) - There were 29 reciprocating-engine failures that 
resulted in unplanned autorotational landing accidents in 1975 as listed below:­
Engine-Failure Cause Possible Contributing Factor 
Unknown 12 Unknown 
Connecting rod/bolts failure 
Exhaust valve failure/sticking or 
poor seating 
6 
4 
Overspeed on startup/improper assembly, 
manufacturing, and quality control 
Improper fuel/fuel contamination/ 
improper mixture control/improper 
manufacturing and quality control 
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TABLE 5. PILOT CAUSAL FACTORS IN 66 AUTOROTATION ACCIDENTS Wr-H U.S. 
GENERAL AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN 1975 
Misjudged speed and-altitude 
Failed to maintain adequate rotor rpm 
Inadequate preflight preparation or planning 
Mismanagement of fuel 
Improper operation of flight controls 
Improper level-off 
Inadequate supervision of flight 
Lack of familiarity with aircraft 
Improper operation of powerplant controls 
Diverted attention from operation of aircraft 
Selected unsuitable terrain 
Misjudged altitude and clearance 
Improper compensation for wind conditions 
Improper in-flight decision/planning 
Failed to follow approved procedures or directives 
Failed to see and avoid objects and obstructions 
Percent 
(66 Accidents) 
27 45 
21 32 
21 32 
15 23 
10 15 
5 7.5 
4 6 
4 6 
3 4.5 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
1 1.5 
I 1.5 
1 1.5 
1 1.5 
Note: Some accidents have more than one cause listed, therefore total percentage 
will exceed 100. 
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Carb icing 	 2 Pilot error 
Fouled plugs 	 1 Improper fuel/maintenance 
Fuel pump failure 	 1 Material 
Cracked distributor 	 1 Material 
Oil exhaustion 	 1 Maintenance/operations 
Valve rocker shaft retaining 1 Quality control ­
plate not installed
 
29
 
Recommendations for reducing reciprocating-engine failures are discussed in paragraph 
4.2.1. 
3.6.2 Summary of pilot causal factors. - Exclusive of autorotation, the remainder of 40 
cases of "failed to maintain rotor rpm," 19 cases of "misjudged speed and altitude," and 35 
cases of "improper operation of flight controls" are generally related to inadequate training, 
inexperience, lack of understanding. of helicopter power required to conduct safe power-on 
landings, and inability to safely control the helicopter under high rotor loading with low rotor 
inertia. The most critical case is in slowing up and flaring for a landing where power required 
increases substantially because of approach to hover. The increased sensitivity to wind shifts 
and inadequate consideration for density altitude (hot/high conditions) frequently result in 
marginal power and sloppy control when landing. 
The related factors of "inadequate preflight preparation/planning," "failed to see/avoid 
objects or obstructions," "misjudged altitude/clearance," and several other pilot causal factors 
cited all reinforce the conclusion that the following are necessary: 
1. 	 Improve pilot training, qualifications, and professionalism 
2. 	 Improve flight operational planning and directives 
3. 	 Design changes to make helicopter more tolerant to hazardous environments-through 
improved stability and control 
4. 	 Provide the pilot with an advanced systems monitor to reduce workload 
Table 6 shows pilot causal factors involved in accidents with fatalities and serious injuries. 
The same factors are involved as in Table 4, but "inadequate preparation and planning," 
"failed to see/avoid objects and obstructions," and "failed to maintain adequate rotor rpm" 
were the top three in order. The foregoing discussion and conclusions are applicable to data 
in Tables 4 and 6. 
20
 
TABLE 6. PILOT CAUSAL FACTORS IN ACCIDENTS WITH FATALITIES ANUSERIOUS
 
-INJURIES WITH U.S. GENERAL AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN 1975
 
Inadequate preparation and planning 
Failed to see/avoid objects or obstructions 
Failed to maintain adequate rotor rpm 
Improper in-flight decision/planning 
M)isjudged altitude/clearance 
.Mismanagement of fuel 
Operation with known deficiencies in equipment 
Continued VFR flightin adverse weather conditions 
Improper operation of flight controls 
Attempted operation beyond experience/ability level 
Diverted attention from operation of aircraft 
Failed to follow approved procedures/directives 
Initiated flight in adverse weather conditions 
Poorly planned approach 
Pilot fatigue 
Misjudged speed, altitude, or clearance 
improper operation of powerpiant controls 
Improper level-off 
Improper compensation for wind conditions 
Exercised poor judgment 
Misjudged speed and altitude 
Spatial disorientation 
Improper emergency procedure (autorotation) 
Percent 
(54 Accidents) 
13 24.1 
10 18.5 
6 11.1 
5 9.3 
5 9.3 
4 7.4 
3 5.6 
3 5.6 
3 5.6 
2 3.7 
2 3.7 
2 3.7 
2 3.7 
2 3.7 
2 3.7 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
1 "1.9 
1 J .9 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
Note: Some accidents have more than.one cause listed, therefore total percentage 
will exceed 100. 
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-K7 Environmental Causal Factors 
Table 7 is.a-breakout of environmental causal factors., -In54 accidents.in 1975 "1high 
obstructions" were hit, which was 18.4 percent of the accidents for that year. "Rough/uneven 
-terrain" and "wet/soft ground" were causal factors'in,32 accidents, or 11.1 percent. The sig­
nificant point about "high obstructions" and "wet/soft ground"As that the majority of these 
accidents are associated with pilot causal factors also. There were 28 collisions with wires and 
43 collisions with objects such as trees, poles, buildings, and crops, which is 24.2 percent of 
293 total accidents. It is interesting to note that the obstacle-strike problems in U.S. Army., 
helicopters also run about 25 percent of the accidents, and studies are in progress to determine 
means to alleviate this problem. The wire-strike problem is discussed in detail in section 4.2.10. 
"Unfavorable wind conditions" and "sudden-wind shift/turbulence" were-involved in 20 
accidents, or 6.8 percent. If we combine all weather conditions except "unfavorable wind 
conditions," that is, "fog, snow, low ceiling, conditions conducive to carburetor icing, and 
rain," only 19 accidents involved these factors, or 6.5 percent. 
In summary, the major environmental causal factors are: 
Obstacle strikes 54 
Terrainconditions §2 
Wind conditions 20 
Weather (visibility and 19 
carburetor ice) 
Major causal factors-of accidents with fatalities-and serious-injuries are summarized as 
follows: 
Obstacle strikes 17 
Weather (visibility) 12 
Wind conditions 4 
3.8 Material and Maintenance Causal Factors 
For the purposes of this study, only turbine-powered helicopter material and maintenance 
factors were studied in detail. These causal factors in reciprocating-engined'helicopters should 
be analyzed to determine future R&D needs for improved safety. 
Table Ishows the turbine-powered helicopter accident record for 1975 by model of air­
craft. Accident rates and general causal factor involvement are shown. Review of the material 
and maintenance factors for turbine-powered helicopters results in the following distribution 
of subsystem involvement: 
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IWBLE-7-ENI!RONMENTAL FACTORS IN AC d 
AVIATIOUHELICOPTERS IN 1975 
High obstructions 
Rough/uneven terrain 
Unfavorable wind conditions 
We;/soft ground 
Downwind conditions 
High density altitude 
Fog 
Snow 
Snow-covered terrain 
Evasive maneuver to avoid collision 
Sun glare 
Low ceiling 
Conditions conducive to carburetor icing 
Sudden windshift/turbulence 
Foreign-object damage 
Obstruction to vision 
Rain 
WENS WITH U.S. GENERAL 
N 
' eecent 
(293 Ac ldents) 
54 18.4 
19 6.5 
16 5.4 
13 4.4 
12 4.1 
8 2.7 
5 1.7 
5 1.7 
5 1.7 
5 1.7 
5 1.7 
4 1.4 
4 1.4 
4 1.4 
4 1.4 
2 0.7 
1 0.3 
TABLE 8. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN ACCIDENTS WITH FATALITIES AND 
SERIOUS INJURIES WITH U.S. GENERAL AVIATION HELICOPTERS 
IN 1975 
High obstructions 
Low ceiling 
Fog 
Snow 
Unfavorable wind conditions 
Rain 
Sudden vindshift/turbulence 
High density altitude 
Wet, soft ground 
Downwind condition 
Rough/ineven terrain 
High vegetation 
Snow-covered terrain 
Percent 
(54 Accidents) 
17 31.5 
4 7.4 
4 7.4 
3 5.6 
3 5.6 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
1 .1.9 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
1 1.9 
1 19 
1 1.9 
23
 
* 	 Powerplant
 
Undetermined reasons 3
 
Compressor failure 
Compressor blade failure 1 ­
1
 
Power-turbine governor failure 1
 
Fuel pump failure 1
 
* 	 Fuel systems
 
Ice in fuel - no deicer 1
 
Fuel contamination 1
 
Fuel gage malfunction 1
 
* 	 Drive
 
Tail rotor drive shafting coupling failure 1
 
o 	 Rotor
 
Tail rotor blade failure (corrosion) 1
 
Main rotor blade failure (corrosion) 1
 
* 	 Flight controls
 
Main rotor pitch change clevis failure 1
 
Bolt came loose from controls 2
 
o 	 Airframe
 
Engine cowling separated inflight1
 
Tail rotor transmission cowling rubbing shaft 1
 
* 	 Equipment
 
Hoist cable separated 1
 
Luggage rack separated 1
 
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that design improvements in the following areas 
are needed: 
* 	 Better understanding of turbine-engine failure causes so that redesign action can take 
place to improve engine reliability (ref. 3). 
o 	 Main and tail rotor blade corrosion control to prevent material failures in blade spars. 
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a 	 Flight controlpos -teLttion bolts to prevent disconnects because of improper 
maintenance such as leaving a n -i ita bolt. 
3.9 	Ratio of Percentage of Accidents by-Percenge ot- m'utory and Type of Flying 
Figure 9 ranks the relative hazards by different types of civil hdiic p r flykc. Where 
the ratio of percentage of accidents to percentage of inventory is above 1.0 (the averag>')-th-2 
type of flying is more hazardous than the average. Other (police/fire, search and rescue, ferry, 
and misceflaneous)-is the worst (2.18), with instruction/training (2.08), agricultural (1.7), 
personal (1.14), and air taxi (1.09) all above average. 
Factors such as type of helicopter, reciprocating or turbine engines, matching causal 
factors to type of flying, and number of flying hours for each type of flying have not been 
broken out in this study. Therefore, it is difficult to draw specific conclusions. A more de­
tailed study of the factors mentioned should be conducted to determine how the more 
hazardous operations could be improved to approach the records compiled by industtial (0.20), 
corporation/executive (0.22) and business flying (0.65); this is discussed further in section 5. 
Typical types of operation in these categories are: 
* 	 Industrial - logging, pipeline, photographic, powerline, and other construction ­
larger aircraft 
* 	 Corporation/executive - company aircraft, professional pilots 
* 	 Business - miscellaneous small companies, nonprofessional pilots 
* 	 Air taxi - transport of personnel and equipment for hire - professional pilots, offshore 
drilling, charter, etc 
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RATIO OF %OF ACCIDENTS/% OF INVENTORY 
10 	 20TYPE OF FLYING 0 
OTHER (POLICE, FIRE, SAR, MISC) " 2.18 
INSTRUCTION, TRAINING 2.08 
AGRICULTURAL (SEEDING, SPRAYING) 	 I 1.7 
PERSONAL (PLEASURE) 1.14
 
Al R TAXI (CHARTER, OFFSHORE DRILLING j 1.09
 
- PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT)
 
BUSINESS (NONPROFESSIONAL PILOTS) f 0.65
 
CORP/EXEC (PROFESSIONAL PILOTS) m 0.22 DATA BASE: 	 1974 AND 1075 
INDUSTRIAL 	(CONSTRUCTION 0.20 2,960,070 FLYING HOURS 
- PROFESSIONAL PILOTS) 
0' 
TNG
PERS 6.1 
OTHER - PERSONAL (1.3) 
7BUS 4.7 
9.6 217TNG 5.0 AIR TAXI 
%OF TOTAL 33.5 
%OF TOTAL OTHERINVENTORY 
FLYING HOURS 6.1BY TYPE OF 

FLYING EXECINDUSTRIAL 
 BY TYPE OF 
1 	 21.2 FLYING 10.1 INDUSTRIAL 
AGRICULT 
14.0 
Figure 9. Percentages of helicopter inventory, flying hours, and accidents by type of flying 
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4.0 TECHNOLOGY AND OPEkraTING CHARACTERISTICS
 
FOR ACCIDENT PREVELTKQN
 
Major areas that impact civil helicopter safety are discussed in this secil . The status of 
technology, gaps intechnology, and needed advances are discussed and identifiea-"-­
4.1 Operator Comments on Safety Hazards 
A questionnaire was sent to over 200 civil helicopter operators covering the major types 
of operations encountered; to date, approximately 40 replies have been received. In addition, 
several large operators, pilots, accident investigators, insurance underwriters, and claims ad­
justers were interviewed for comments on helicopter safety. The following suggestions and 
problem areas were identified (note that no attempt at ranking has been made, but they are 
categorized). 
4.1.1 Design considerations. - The following items were identified: 
1. 	 Crashworthy fuel system to prevent crash fires. 
2. 	 Design helicopters to withstan.d one blade damper failure without incident. 
3. 	 Pitot tubes get hit when in hangar. 
4. 	 Chin-height stabilizers hurt people. 
5. 	 Pilot on right side to protect from blade penetration into cabin during crash. 
6. 	 Tinted glass spoils wire vision in wet weather. 
7. 	 Civil helicopters are operated to limit on daily basis. Helicopters are put into the field 
without sufficient high-load Testing to stand up under such usage. TBO's should reflect 
this kind of work. 
8. 	 Rotor clearance should be 1.4 feet (like Bell 205) to prevent contact with ground
 
personnel or passengers.
 
9. 	 Passenger loading and unloading and baggtge compartments should not be near exhaust 
for noise and inhalation of fumes. 
10. 	 Make it easy for the pilot to identify which engine is failing (by proper -warning light) 
so that there is no possibility of grabbing the wrong low-sped governor contraL 
11. 	 Tail rotors should be high enough to clear brush and people (6.5 feet at bottom) and
 
- '
include a guard ring ror people and obstacles.
12. 	 Extended skid gear should berequred for all helicopters operating in rough terrain to 
prevent rocks from penafing the fuselage. 
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13. 	 Improve cockpit crash survival features such as restraints, eliminate lethal protuberances, 
and require lightweight bclmets. 
14. 	 Be sure that threaded fasteners are-in such a direction as to not unscrew in operation. 
15. 	 Autostart system required for momentary power failure due to fuel, ice, FOD, etc. 
4.1.2 	Operational considerations. - These items were mentioned frequently: 
1. 	 Many accidents can be avoided by good planning of operation and good, clear debriefing; 
treat every mission as new and notroutine. 
2. 	 Pilots do not have a good understanding of helicopter low-speed aerodynamics, par­
ticularly regarding landings under power-off autorotation or-power-on high/hot
 
marginal-power conditions.
 
3. 	 Insure proper filtering and precautions to keep dirt and water out of fuel (main problem 
is in the truck). 
4. 	 Improve training and high-visibility marking to eliminate injuries from personnel walking 
into the tail rotor. 
4.2 Accident Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and R&D Needs 
Table 9 presents a summary of accident causes, technical solutions, recommendations, 
and research and development needs to fill gaps. Where existing technology is considered to be 
adequate, even though it may require substantial nonrecurring and recurring dollars to imple­
ment in the civil fleet, the R&D-needed column states "None". Each item listed in the table 
is discussed in the following paragraphs; R&D needs are elaborated in section 5 of this report. 
4.2.1 Reciprocating-engine failure. - Examination of reciprocating-engine failure modes 
and possible contributing factors indicates the following actions to alleviate the engine-failure 
problem: 
* Improve quality control in engine manufacture and-overhaul.
 
a Improve engine-failure analysis, reporting, and fixes as necessary to improve reliability.
 
* 	 Improve pilot training:
 
1. 	In engine starting to prevent overspeeds 
2. 	 In use of correct fuel mixtures 
3. 	 In use of carburetor heat in icing conditions. 
* 	 Insure proper fuel is used when available. 
It is evident that there will be a continuing demand for reciprocating-engine power in 
new small helicopters because of cost. Some of the engines will be those now uged in fixe&wing 
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TABLE 9. CAUSES OF CIVIL HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS', AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Accident Cause 
1. Reciprocating engine faiiure 
2. Turbine engine failure 
3. Fuel contamination 
4. Twin-turbine OEI 
5. Fuel exhaustion 
6. Power-off autorotation (failed engine 
or practice autorotation to power-off 
landing) 
Solution/Recommendation 
a. 	 Phase out older aircraft, improves 
operating procedures, and reduce 
engine overspeed 
a. 	 Improve reliability of turbine engines; 
install health monitors to prevent in­
flight failures 
a. 	 Install filters/separators on hose 
near the nozzle to separate water 
a. 	 Provide engine restart capability 
b. 	 Provide HOEI contingency power 
c. 	 Provide failure warning so good 
engine will not be shutdown 
inadvertently 
a. 	 Improve operational planning 
b. 	 Improve fuel gaging/warning systems 
a. 	 Improve pilot knowledge of helicopter 
low-speed aerodynamic characteris- 
tics on landihg 
b. 	 Improve practice autorotation pro-
cedures and pilot qualification 
R&D 	Needed 
Study to determine what needs to 
be done such as improved bolt 
stretch add torqueing control 
a. 	 See Reference 3 
None 
a. Study to determine what could 
be done 
b. See Reference 4 
None 
None 
None 
Develop an accurate omnidirectional 
low-airspeed system (such as LORAS) 
and improve accuracy in autorotation 
and put intg production 
Develop an autorotation simulator to 
assist in pilot training, similar to those 
used by the U.S. Army at Fort 
Rucker, Alabama 
TABLE 9 - Continued 
Accident Cause Solution/Recommendation R&D Needed 
6. Continued C. Investigate potential changes to 
stability and control and rotor inertia 
to reduce hazard 
e. Study helicopter characteristics 
by type and accident history to 
determine design criteria changes 
needed. 
7. Power-on takeoff, landing, hover 
maneuvers, and cruise flight (pilot 
causal factors) 
a. Improve pilot knowledge of helicopter 
low-speed aerodynamic characteristics 
and power required versus power 
available 
a. Study the small operator versus 
large operator to define short­
comings in operations, planning, 
and pilot qualifications and 6a 
above 
b. Phase out older aircraft, go to single and 
twin engines with better power match, 
and improve cockpits for reduced 
workload 
b. Conduct cockpit human factors 
study for reduced workload and 
improved visibility; develop 
advanced systems monitor 
C. Investigate potential changes to stability 
and control and rotor inertia to reduce 
c. Same as 6c 
hazard 
8. High/hot operation a. Install a power-remaining indicator 
(YUH-61A type) 
None 
b. Provide HOGE contingency power b. See Reference 4 
9. Inadequate operational planning 
and controls 
a. Improve planning and debriefings and 
avoid letting missions become routine; 
reduce compladency 
a. Same as 7a 
TABLE 9 - Continued 
Accident Cause Solution/Recommendation R&D Needed 
10. Wire strikes and obstacles such as 
trees, poles, buildings, and crops 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Pilot training and. awareness of wire, 
avoidance techniques 
Install wire cutters, deflectors, and 
detectors 
Reduce pilot complacency in 
'maneuvering close to obstacles 
None 
b. Design and test wire cutters, 
deflectors, and detectors 
C. None 
11. Adverse terrain factors (pilot 
judgment) 
a. Pilot training and experience a; None 
12. Adverse wind'conditions a. 
b. 
Improve operational planning dnd 
pilot awareness of aircraft limitations 
Increase control margin 
a. 
b. 
None 
Same as 6c 
13. Weather - inadvertent entry into 
low visibility (fog, snow, rain, haze, 
and darkness) 
a. 
b. 
Install limited IFR instruments and 
train pilots to use 
Trend is to increased TFR capability 
a. 
b. 
Sane as 6a, 6c, and 7b 
Same as 6a, 6c, and 7b 
14. Main rotor blade failure a. 
b. 
Composite blades 
Corrosion control 
a. 
b. 
None 
None 
c. 
d. 
Install blade inspection equipment 
Blade retention assurance 
c. 
d. 
None 
None 
15. Flight controls disconnects 
e. 
a. 
Failsafe blades (multiple spars) 
Flight controls positive-tetention 
bolts 
a. 
a. 
None 
None 
TABLE 9 - Continued 
Accident Cause Solution/Recommendation R&D Needed 
16. Tail rotor failures a,. Improve QC of tail rotor gearboxes a. None 
b. 
c. 
Improve diagnostics to warn of 
impending failure 
Composite blades and techniques to 
improve obstacle strike survivability 
b. 
C. 
Develop incipient failure detec­
tion equipment for production 
and field use, Reference 5 
Design and test new concepts 
17. Postcrash fire a., Retrofit crashworthy fuel systems a. None 
b. Design new helicopters with crashworthy 
fuel systems 
b. None 
" 18. Crash injuries/fatalities in 
survivable crashes, 
a. Crashworthy structure in all new heli-
copters 
a. None (change FAA criteria) 
b. Energy-absorbing crew and passenger 
seating 
b. Complete development of energy­
absorbing seats 
C. Delethalize occupied space 
d. Provide pilots with lightweight crash 
helmets 
c. 
d. 
None' 
None 
19. Inaccurate airspeed indication 
(pitot-static system plugged up) 
a. Maintenance to keep pitot-static system 
drained and clean 
a. None 
b. Provide accurate omnidirectional low-' 
airspeed system and improve airspeed 
position error accuracy for autorotation, 
slow climbout, etc 
b. Same as 6a 
aircraft adapted for helicopter use. It is imperative that reciprocating-engine reliability be 
improved since the engine-failure accident rate for 1975 is 3.94/100,000 flying hours, com­
pared with 0.96/100,000 flying hours for turbine-engine civil helicopters. 
Introduction of turbine engines can-be expected to substantially reduce the accident rate 
simply through a reduction in engine failures which result in autorotational-landing accidents. 
Any available R&D funds are more likely to be used to improve turbines than reciprocating 
engines. One area that needs further understanding is the trend in helicopter use for crop­
dusting and spraying. Turbine engines are susceptible to buildup of chemicals on compressor 
blades and therefore, as turbine-engine helicopters became operational for this use,,it may be 
necessary to provide special inlet filters or separators. 
The-maijufacturers of new reciprocating-powered helicopters such as the Enstrom 280 
Shark,, the Robinson R22, and-the Hunt HS-!80 Hunter must take steps to prevent engine 
failures from.creating a bad accident record. This isespeciaJly true since the market for these 
aircraft will tend to be the.small operator wanting the least-expensive helicopter and probably 
operating under the weakest FAA controls with minimal pilot qualifications. In fact, piloting 
will most likely be a secondary job in many-cases. All of these factors tend to increase the 
possibility of high accident rates, in the opinion of the author. 
4.2.2 Turbin-engine failure. - Turbine-engine reliability improvements to prevent in­
flight failures are discussed in reference .S. There were seven turbine-enoine failures that caused 
accidents-in 1975: 3 undetermined, 1 compressor failure, 1 compressor blade failure, I power­
turbine governor failure, and,1 fuel-pump failure. The fact that .4 percent of the causes were 
undetermined reveals a deficiency in the accident-investigation system. Powerplant failure 
history and determination of exact cause have historically been poor. Therefore, the data con­
tained in the reliability report (reference 3) is helpful since it takes into account a larger 
sampling of failures, even though not all of the failures caused accidents. it is concluded that 
all powerplant and related fuel system compor(ent failures should be tracked and fixed. Where 
research and development is needed it is listed in reference 3. 
4.2.3 Fuel contamination. - Encine failures because of fuel contamination can be pre­
vented with existing technology. Fuel filters and. separators should be installed on fuel trucks 
to prevent contaminants from entering the aircraft tank. Fuel filters are usually installed at 
the inlet to the engine fuel pump and, depending on the severity of the problem, an additional 
filter can be installed in the fuel line between the aircraft tank and the encine. The U.S. 
Marines found that both fuel supply truck filters and the additional fuel filter in the fuel line 
were necessary for operation in Vietnam. No R&D is necessary to apply this technology. It 
is reported by HAA representatives that fuel contamination problems have diminished in the 
past 2 years because of aggressive efforts to filter fuel in the civil fleets. Water in fuel is the 
only remaining problem of significance. 
4.2.4 Twin-turbine one engine inoperative. - it has been suggested that engine restart 
capability be improved. There are several modes of engine failure or flameout that occur that 
may be amenable to engine restarting: deceleration compressor stall caused by blade erosion, 
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flameout in heavy rain or snow, stator-vane trailing-edge damage from FOD, ice causing com­
pressor stalling, and fuel-control malfunctions causing engine shutdown. Research and de­
velopment to improve engine restart capability are discussed in section 5.
 
Research to provide hover with one engine inoperative (HOEI) was identified in reference 4. 
The recommendation was to provide a 2-1/2-minute contingency-power rating of double the 
30-minute power rating by a combination of wet and dry augmentation. Dry augmentation 
increases engine speed up to 8 percent with up to a 20-percent absolute turbine-inlet­
temperature-increase. Wet augmentation requires the addition of a water-alcohol inlet-injection 
system to provide increased mass flow and power without further increase in engine speed or 
temperature. 
It is recommended that twin-turbine helicopters be equipped with positive identification 
of the failed engine by a lighted condition-lever'handle or equivalent so that the good engine
 
will not be shut down inadvertently. For single-engine helicopters a failure-warning device
 
would alert the pilot on landing approach where an engine failure would not affect rotor rpm
 
or would not be easily detected by engine instruments until power is required for the landing
 
flare. No new technology is involved.
 
-
4.2.5 Fuel exhaustion. - This problem is do obvious that it just seems as though pilot 
complacency is the whole issue. However, several possible reasons for fuel exhaustion are
 
listed below to assist in determining what to do about it:
 
* 	 Fuel gagiig and warning light systems in small helicopters are typically prone to errors
 
and inaccuracies.
 
" 	 Not all helicopters have low-fuel warning lights. 
" 	 Pilots frequently operate with partial fuel so that maximum loads can be carried, par­
ticularly in agricultural work where both fuel and chemicals.arereplenished.at -thesame
 
firne (-maximum chemicals and minimum fuel).
 
" 	 Improper estimates of fuel consumption in mountainous terrain or in headwind conditions. 
* 	 Maintenance personnel fuel inadequate quantity. 
* 	 Pilots in agricultural applications forget to watch fuel. 
No new technology is necessary to solve the fuel exhaustion problem. The most obvious 
solution would appear to be more accurate low-level gaging and an audible warning at 5 
minutes prior to empty. The standard warning light that is used in military aircraft for 20 
minutes fuel remaining would also be helpful in many cases, but not in agricultural work where 
pilots are frequently in the 0 to 20 minutes of fuel range. 
For helicopters with more sophisticated.instrumentation such as the advanced systems
 
monitor which involves microprocessors, a fuel-use-rate function could be added with voice
 
warning to prevent fuel exhaustion.
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4.2.6 Power-off autorotation. - Power-off autorotation landing accidents can be reduced 
considerably by increased engine reliability and updating to single and twin turbines. However, 
engine failures will always be with us and it is unlikely that all helicopters will have two 
engines. Therefore, the autorotational landing itself must be made safer by the following 
changes: 
a - Improve.pilot training, qualifications, and:understanding of helicopter low-speed aero­
dynamics. In the critical landing maneuver the pilot bften misjudges speed, altitude, and 
-rotor rpm and iiconsequence makes a hard landing, hits something, or lands on improper 
terrain because of lack of rotor-energy power margins to properly maneuver., More train­
ing and practice would help this situation. 
a -Reduce the hazard by designing a more forgiving helicopter. Helicopters having inadequate 
rotor inertia and stability and control must be improved. It is recommended that heli­
copter characteristics be studied and design criteria be changed for input into new heli­
copter desidns. This is discussed further in section 5. 
4.2.7 Power-on takeoff, landing, hover maneuvers, and cruise flight (pilot causal 
factors). - These types of accident frequently result from inadequate pilot-qualifications, lack 
of understanding of the helicoprer power-required curve, and lack of a low-airspeed indication 
system. improved training and pilot manual explanations of power required, particularly in 
hover maneuvers, sideways flight, rearward flight, and landing transi-tion flight, are necessary 
combined with development of an accurate, omnidirectional low-airspeed system. 
As in power-off autorotational landings, it appears that the helicopter stability arid con­
trol characteristics may be in need of change. It is recommended that these be studied and 
design changes made where appropriate. 
Another area that needs attention is the cockpit arrangement, instrument layout, and 
specialized helicopter instruments to reduce pilot workload and improve visibility. As more 
helicopter IFR capability becomes available and more weather and nght conditions are 
encountered, there will be increased hazards such as the disorientation phenomenon that is 
now predominantly a fixed-wing aircraft and Navy helicopter piloting problem (ref. 6, 7). 
An additional problem is that of getting IFR certification for helicopters. The stability and 
control requirements and low-speed measuring systems need to be related specifically co 
helicopters and should not be based on fixed-wing aircraft stability, as is now the case. At 
present, there is pressure to relax requirements for helicopter IFR because- fixed-wing aircraft 
stability and control are so hard to achieve. This area needs level-headed study to prevent 
arbitrary relaxation which could lead to higher accident rates. in addition, the small operator 
versus the large operator situation and different uses of helicopters need to be input to-insure 
that safe design criteria are established. This is discussed further in section 5. 
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4.2.8 High/hot operation. - The high/hot marginal power situation comes about because 
of poor anticipation of density altitude at destinations or remote landing sites. The pilot is 
frequently unaware that he is flying into a landing with inadequate power available for 
maneuvering, particularly in adverse wind conditions. A power-available indicator mounted 
on the instrument panel alongside the torquemeter would indicate when the aircraft was 
about to enter marginal power conditions; a typical installation is shown in Figure 10. Existing 
technology can be applied. A more advanced system could include engine parameters for input 
into the advanced systems monitor to provide power degradation information. 
Providing contingency power as discussed in paragraph 4.2.4 and reference 4 would also 
help prevent the high/hot operational accidents. 
4.2.9 Inadequate operational planning and controls. - Improved planning, good debrief­
ings, avoiding letting missions become routine, reducing complacency, and planning for the 
average pilot's capability are all necessary to reduce this cause of accidents. This is one area 
where U.S. Army and Navy operations are generally superior to the civil operators and probably 
accounts for the better accident record. However, it is well-known that many of the larger 
civil operators are very meticulous in operations, planning, and pilot qualifications and conse­
quently have a good accident record as evidenced by low insurance rates. Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the differences between the large and small operator and also the 
type of helicopter and its use to determine shortcomings in operations, planning, and pilot 
qualifications. Many civil helicopter operations have more demanding tasks than the military 
and these need further study. This is-discussed further in section 5. 
4.2.10 Wire strikes. - The current rate of wire strike accidents is 2.6 per 100,000 flying 
hours, 34 percent of which have fatalities or serious injuries and 30 percent of the aircraft 
are destroyed or have substantial damage. Reference 8 presents statistics which are reproduced 
in Tables 10 and 11. The following factors illustrate where the wire strike problem lies by 
types of operation; 
" Agricultural 41 percent 
* Business operations 25 percent 
o Police and firefighting 17.5 percent 
Approximately 50 percent of the wire strike accidents occur below 50 feet altitude. 
Many of these accidents occur because pilots are forced down to the deck by bad weather 
through lack of IFR capability. 
Figure 11 illustrates the problems of wire strike. Wire avoidance is the most effective 
means for decreasing wire strike accidents and the following pertinent points are brought out: 
o Fly high. 
* Fly slow if low. 
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The power-available indicator is mounted or. the pilot's instrument panel next to 
the torquemeter. It indicates maximum dual engine torque available, predicated 
on barometric pressure, altitude, and temperature. Setting the lower pressure knob 
or the upper altitude knob moves the pointer over the torquemeter scale up or 
down. The pointer then sets the dual engine torque limit for existing or predicted 
atmospheric conditions. Values set into this instrument are for a standard engine 
and would not account for engine degradation from environmental factors such as 
sand, dust, and corrosion. 
Figure 10. Power-available indicator 
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TABLE 10. U.S. CIVILIAN HELICOPTER WIRE-STRIKE ACCIDENT STATISTICS
 
1973 1974 1975 1976* 
Total Accidents 
Wire-Strike Accidents 
Percent of Total 
Damages: a. Destroyed 
b. Substantial 
Injuries: a. Fatal 
b. Serious 
251 
29 
11.5 
9 
20 
4 
11 
258 
26 
10.0 
8 
18 
9 
3 
293 
25 
8.5 
7 
18 
7 
3 
267 
28 
10.4 
Not yet available 
c. Mirior 27 29 -24 
Source: HAA and NTSB 
* Preliminary 
TABLE 11. HELICOPTER WIRE-STRIKE ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION 
1973 1974 1975 Total 
FAR 135 (Air taxi, commercial) 2 5 1 8 
FAR 137 (Agricultural) 15 8 10 33 
FAR 91 (Business, pleasure) 7 8 10 25 
(Police) 3 3 2 8 
(Firefighter) 2 2 2 6 
29 26 25 80
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Figure 11. Slower is better vhen it comes to outmaneuvering wires 
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* 	 Head-up scan. 
* 'Diligent flight planning; avoid complacency. 
* 	 FAA regulations to require wire marking (conspicuity). 
* 	 Don't fly low in poor visibility. 
a 	 R&D on wire detectors. 
The following design innovations have been suggested for increased survivability if a wire 
strike occurs: 
* 	 Wire cutters (blades, controls, and-windshields). 
* 	 Wire deflectors (controls, windshields, landing gear, and tail rotor). 
The U.S. Army Aviation Air Mobility Research and Development Laboratory has recently 
let.a contract to Bell to studyhelicopter obstacle strikes which includes the wire strike problem. 
It is anticipated that solutions to the Wire strike hazard will be developed for incorporation in 
Army helicopters and will eventually be installed on civil helicopters. However, until wire 
cutters and deflectors have been developed through analysis and test, it is believed that a sig­
nificant~improvement in civil helicopter safety can result from pilot training in wire avoidance 
and wire marking where appropriate. 
A U.S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety (USAAAVS) article, reference 9, summarizes 
the solutions to the wire strike problems as follows:" 
"'Asfor thefuture, recommendationsare for the Army to examine the 
feasibility of using wirecuttinganddetectingdevices asprotective aids 
againstwire hazards. Meanwhile, we should avoidcomplacency, continue 
to emphasize the hazardsassociatedwith wires, and maintainthe effective 
supervision and controlspresently in force. In addition, the following 
protective measuresshould be reviewed andfollowed: 
* 	 Review unitSOPs and directives relative to low-levelflying to 
make certain they reflect the safestprocedurespossiblefor the 
types ofmissions beingflown. 
o 	 Provide adequatesupervision to ensure pilots adhereto established 
policies. 
" 	 Limit the minimum altitudefor requiredlow-level flight training 
(outside theformalNOE program) to 150 feet above the terrain, 
or to lower altitudesover prescribedflight courses known to be 
free of wires. 
a 	 When low-level flights are required,provide pilots with current 
maps that show wire obstacles, and make certain that crews 
receive thorough briefings. 
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a" 	 Where possible, mark al!.wires aroundtakeoff andlandingpoints 
on militaryreservationsand airfields. 
* 	 Unless requiredby missions, avoid'low-levelflight over areasknown 
to contain wires and over rangeswhere.fine TOW (missile) wire can 
pose a potential threat. ­
a 	 Use all crewmembers in searchingfor wireobstructionsduringall 
low-level flights and ensure maximum coordination between them. 
S 	 -Keepin mind, the closerto the ground that low-levelflight must 
be conducted, the slower the ai;speedshould be." 
Research and development recommendations are covered in section 5. 
4.2.11 Adverse terrain factors (pilot judgment). - This type of accident involves landing 
on slopes, rocks, soft ground, and other adverse terrain conditions creating situations which 
cause accidents. Where no other contributing factors are involved, improved pilot training and 
mature judgment are probably the only solutions. 'When adverse terrain is encountered during 
marginal power situations or forced landings, the previously discussed power-available indicator, 
potential design criteria changes for improved stability and control, and cockpit human factors 
changes for improved visibility and reduced workload would apply. These are discussed in 
section 5. 
4.2.12 Adverse wind conditions. - To combat this type of accident it is necessary to 
tmprove operational planning and pilot awareness of aircraft limitations in adverse wind con­
ditions. In some helicopters there is probably a need for increased stability and control 
margins, which is covered in previous discussions and in section 5. 
4.2.13 Weather and low visibility factor. - Inadvertent entry into low visibility con­
dicions such as fog, snow, rain, haze, and darkness can cause loss of horizon with disorienta­
tion, becoming lost, and flying into obstacles either in cruise or in attempted landings. It is 
generally agreed that the trend is toward increased IFR capability through installation of 
avionics and instruments in helicopters and completion of the LORANt C chains to cover all 
of the United States. IFR capability is necessary in order to maximize helicopter utilization 
and improve profits. If accompanied by pilot IFR qualifications, the helicopter safety record 
should be greatly improved. However, there still remains the problem of inadequate helicopter 
stability to meet FAA regulations for IFR certification in many helicopters. The general 
opinion is that subjecting the helicopter to fixed-wing aircraft stability and control criteria 
is too ristrictina and unnecessary. This area needs further study and definition, taking into 
account the special capabilities and uses of the helicopter, pilot qualification, and pushing the 
limits too far. Therefore, the IFR situation for the small, poorly equipped operator needs to 
be scudied in mre detail before accepting increased IFR capability as a panacea for weather 
flying accidents. This is discussed further in section 5. 
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4.2.14 Main rotor blade failure. - Metal rotor blade spars have a corrosion/fatigue 
failure history that continues to cause catastrophic accidents. Adhesive bond separation of 
blade boxes, particularly the root box, permits water to become trapped in the bond; this 
leads eventually to corrosion pitting of the spar with drastic loss of fatigue life. Corrosion 
control and blade inspection methods consisting of either pressurized or evacuated spars 
which provide a warning when a crack allows air to leak through it are an acceptable solution 
to this problem. More recently the introduction of composite rotor blades having no metal has 
greatly reduced the potential for blade spar failure. Most composite rotor blades have no need 
for blade inspection systems because failures are rare; the material is not susceptible to cor­
rosion; the material is extremely damage tolerant; and the redundancy provided with numerous 
individual glass fibers acting as load paths make failure progression very slow and visually 
inspectable. No new technology is necessary and all active military helicopters are scheduled 
for eventual retrofit of composite blades. The introduction of composite blades into the civil 
fleet will be slower, but when it happens it will provide increased safety. 
4.2.15 Flight controls disconnects. - This problem results from nuts backing off because 
they have not been safety-wired or cotter-pinned, or because mechanics forget to install nuts. 
In military helicopters most critical bolted connections in flight controls now have positive­
retention bolts which feature spring-loaded mechanisms that prevent bolts from falling out 
even if the nut is not present. No new technology is required. 
4.2.16 Tail rotor failures. - Failures of tail rotor gearboxes, rotor, and control com­
ponents result in loss of directional control and usually cause a serious accident. If the tail­
boom and vertical and horizontal tailplanes remain intact, it is possible to make a safe landing. 
The usual case is that with the limited directional stability from the remaining vertical tail 
the landing maneuver is too demanding for most pilots. Therefore, preventive measures such 
as improved quality control of the tail rotor components, designing tail rotor drive systems to 
accept transient fatigue loads, designing tailbooms strong enough for fatigue loads, corrosion 
control on tailbooms, maintenance procedures to provide system integrity, tail rotor blade 
design for damage resistance/tolerance, and incipient failure detection are all needed. 
Research and development are needed to apply a newly developed incipient failure de­
tection (IFD) system for airborne monitoring of tail rotor gearboxes and other components. 
This equipment appear to be capable of providing a cockpit warning of incipient failures 
originating in tail rotor gearing and bearings so that precautionary landings can be made before 
catastrophic failure. 
Improved tail rotor blades with greater damage tolerance and/or protective features need 
to be developed. New concepts should be designed and tested. Both IFD and improved tail 
rotor blades are discussed in section 5. 
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4.2.17 Crashworthiness and oostcrash fire. - The Army's crashworthiness requirements 
are'much more severe than those of the FAA. Furthermore, most of them are not readily 
accommodated unless included, at the time of basic configuration layout (ref. 10). 
The requirements contained'in Military Standard 1290 (Table 12) are well-founded in 
extensive accident data studies and survivable crash impact analyses (Figure 12). Reference 11 
is a crash survival design guide based on these studies and on crash testing. Where they have 
been applied, they have proven exceptionally successful; for example, the crashworthy-fuel­
system retrofit to Army helicopters (Table 13) where there hasn't been a single thermal injury 
since introduction of the system. . 
4.2.18 Crash injuriesand fatalities in survivable crashes. - The key features of the basic 
configuration necessary to adcomplish such crash protection are shown in Figure 13. When 
accommodated from the beginning, the costs of this protection are minimal and, according to 
the U.S. Army, very cost-effective (Figure 14). 
So, unless designed to these requirements from the-beginning, it is difficult to imagine a 
civil helicopter being acceptable to the U.S. Army without major change. 
Review of fatal accident records at the NTSB had limited value because autopsy reports 
were not available. However, the accidents all proved zo be typical of those with military 
helicopters which have been extensively analyzed. Figures 15 and 16 identify the inadequacies 
in crashworthy features in potentially preventable injuries and fatalities in order of importance. 
Figure 17 shows a schematic of an energy-absorbing passenger seat being developed under 
NASA funding for-fixed-wing aircraft which is predominantly for forward accelerations. 
Similar seats for helicopcer passengers would have different kinematics to change the stroking 
and energy-absorbing characteristics, placing more emphasis on vertical accelerations. 
In a study at the U.S. Army Agency for Aviation Safery in 1975 (reference 12), the 
following conclusions were reached: 
"a. 	 Crashworthyrequirements,as outlined in MilitaryStandardJ290 (5), 
are cost effective for the military UTTAS helicopter. The initialand 
recurringcosts, as estimatedin this report,are amortized in three to 
ten years. 
b. 	 The most worthwhile crashworthyfeatures which influence the 
prevention and/orreduction of occupant injuriesandhardware 
damage are lfisted in an estimatedorder ofpriorityaccordingto 
their relative cost-effectiveness. 
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TABLE 12. CRASHWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS OF MILITARY STANDARD 1290
 
Requirements
 
Impact Condition _ - structural Other
 
Longitudinal 	 20 fps into rigid wall; safe evacuation 95th-percentile seats; cockpit; 
of crew 50 fps, MIL-S-58095 
passenger: 50 fps 
40 fps into rigid wall; troop­
compartment reduction no more 
than 15% 
60 fps at 100 nose down; reduction 
of cockpit or troop-compartment 
living space no more than 5% 
Vertical 	 42 fps; living space reduction no 95th-percentile seats; cockpit 
more than 15% and passenger: 42 fps 
Lateral 	 30 fps; reduction in compartment 95th-percentile seats; 30 fps 
living space no more than 15% 
Turnover Structure 	 Aircraft resting on ground; 4W 
perpendicular to WL; 4W longi­
tudinally parallel to WL; 2W 
laterally 
Ground impact at 100 fps at 50 
angle; passenger-occupied volume 
reduction no more than 15% 
Nose Plowing 	 Forward 25% fuselage uniformly 
loaded lOg up and 4 g aft (10g based 
on effective mass); preclude scooping 
Tail Bumper 	 MIL-A-003862A; 10-fps sink speed 
and pitch attitude corresponding to 
IGE hover in 60-knot tailwind 
Blade Strike 	 Rotor mast shall not fail; transmission 
shall not be displaced into occupiable 
section when main-rotor blades impact 
into a rigid 8-inch-diameter object in 
the outer 10% blade radius at opera­
tional rotor speed 
Mass-Item Retention 	 ±20g longitudinal; 20/-10g 
vertical; ±18g lateral 
Postcrash Fire 	 Fluid'containment; ignition 
sources; separation of fluids 
from occupants; shielding 
Evacuation 	 30-second evacuation time 
(crew and passengers) 
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Figure 12. The relationship of survivability and speed at crash impact 
TABLE 13. NO THERMAL INJURIES WITH CRASHWORTHY FUEL SYSTEMS 
Fatalities Injuries 
Thermal Nonthermal Thermal Nonthermal 
Without CWFS 
AH-IG. 3 36 2 69 
jOH-58A 5 39 3 62 
UH-1D 8 7 1 23 
UH-IH 85 128 80 225 
-Total 101 210 86 379 
With CWFS 
AH-IG 0 8 0 11 
OH-58A 0 5 0 !i 
UH-1D 0 -3 0 18 
UH1-H 0 54 0 255 
Total 0 70 0 295 
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Figure 13. Principal crasiworthiness features of the UH-61A structure 
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Figure 14. UTTAS crashworthiness investment saves the army money as well as lives 
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Figure 15. 	 Identity of hardware deficiencies causing 356 potentially preventable injuries 
(1970 and 1971, from reference 8) 
NUMBER OF PEOPLE KILLED BY INADEQUATE CRASHWORTHY FEATURES
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 70 75 80 85
 
POSTCRSH FIRE
 
POOR RESTRAINT SYSTEM
 
POOR CRASH-FORCE ATTENUATION 
RESTRAINT PROVIDED, NOT USED 
INWARD BUCKLING/CRUSHING OF FUSELAGE 
FUSELAGE PENETRATION BY ROTOR BLADES, TRANSMISSION, OR TREES 
NO SEAT PROVIDED 
PI LOTS
 
OTHER
 
PoZ 	 ZJ OTHERSPOOR CARGO TIEDOWN 
Figure 16. 	 Identity of hardware deficiencies causing 160 potentially preventable fatalities 
(1970 and 1971, from reference 8) 
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Figure 17. Crashworthy seat for passengers in fixed-wing aircraft 
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Reduction of OccupantInjury Reduction ofHardwareDamage 
1. Improved occupantrestraint, 1. Protectedtail rotorwith impact 
especially upper torso, to prevent tolerantblades. 
flailing injuries. 
2. Fuselagerollovercapability 2. Improved landinggear to prevent 
without collapse, rollover,as well asgreaterabsorp­
tion of sink speed energy. 
3. Improved landinggear to prevent 3. Impact-tolerantmain rotorblade 
snagging/gougingand resultant tips and transmissionintegrity 
rollove, as vfell as greaterab- to sustain unbalanced loads from 
sorptionofsink speed energy, bent/broken/missingtips. 
4. Increased 'load-limiting' capacity 4. Crashworthy fiel system. 
ofseats andfuselage structure 
to prevent back injury. 
5. Crashworthyfuel system." 
4.2.19 Inaccurate airspeed indication. - Although this problem does not stand out in 
accident causal statistics, HAA representatives have found numerous cases of inaccurate air­
speed indication because of improper cleaning and draining of the pitot-static system. Pitot 
tubes are susceptible to plugging with dirt and water, which generally results in an erratic 
reading. This means that (1) autorotational speeds are frequently high with a higher than 
necessary rate of descent; and (2) Vne's are exceeded resulting in potential fatigue damage to 
rotor components or high-speed rotor instabilities, depending on what dictated the Vne limit. 
Good maintenance practices should prevent these inaccuracies and reduce accidents. 
4.2.20 Advanced systems monitor. - With the introduction of more complex helicopters 
and terrain flight profiles, additional demands are placed on the flight crew in terms of their 
anticipatory and decision-making capabilities. It is now possible with state-of-the-art display 
and computer systems to provide the crew with properly processed information to enhance 
their performance and reduce workload. 
The Advanced Systems Monitor (ASM) is a general purpose, time-shared, electro-optical 
display driven by an on-board computer. The ASM has the potential to replace conventional 
subsystem instruments and annunciator panels and permits the crew increased outside-the­
cockpit attentiveness. 
The ASM would not be considered a primary flight display and would not be flight­
safety critical in a first-failure condition.-
All subsystems, excluding navigation-communication and flight displays, would be 
included. A generic listing using existing helicopters would include analysis of the following 
subsystems: 
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* - Fuel system quantity and use rate 
* Hydraulic-system 
* Electrical system­
* APU'system 
* Engines 
. Transmissions 
* Annunciator displays 
* Flight manual normal and emergency checklists 
* Battery system 
* Flight manual performance data 
* Incipient failure detection (iFD) of critical systems 
* Collision avoidance 
* Primary display backup . 
e Navigation 
A study is recommended to define ASM requirements and potential benefits in the 
various civil helicopter types and to-define a developmental program., 
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5.0 RESEARCH REQUIRED TO IMPROVE SAFETY 
Accident statistics and dausal factors for general aviation helicopters were reviewed in 
section 3.0. Section 4.0 covered the status of technology needed to improve civil helicopter 
safety and to achieve the goals established in section 2.0. Gaps in technology that require 
research and development to provide solutions for improved safety are discussed here. 
5.1 Turbine-Engine Reliability, Contingency Power, and Diagnostics 
The following areas need R&D to reduce turbine-engine power failure accidents. 
5.1..1 Improve reliability to greatly reduce in-flight engine failures which usually result 
in accidents. Reference 3 covers this subject and makes specific recommendations for R&D. 
Some of the more significant actions are: (1) to require more detailed reporting on cause of 
failure in the M or D reporting system at engine overhaul facilities; for example, the causes of 
four out of the eight turbine-engine failures (accidents) in 1975 were undetermined; and (2) 
introduction of an aggressive failure analysis and fix program with engine manufacturers. 
5.1.2 A 2-1/2-minute contingency-power rating of two times the 30-minute power rating 
is achievable with a combination of wet and dry augmentation. This R&D program is outlined 
in reference 4. Estimated nonrecurring costs for the program are: 
o 	 Engine emergency power by wet and dry augmentation $3 million 18 months" 
o 	 Associated helicopter development $2.5 million - 24 months 
5.1.3 Develop lightweight, low-cost, engine health-monitoring systems that will diagnose 
impending failures in time to prevent occurrence in flight. The newer turbine engines (such 
as the GE T700) have health-monitoring diagnostic systems but there is still a need for re­
finement and adaptation to the other turbine engines used in civil helicopters. The most 
practical solution is to provide an on-board minicomputer with multiplexing and memory 
storage for trending of critical parameters. The engine health parameters would only be a 
portion of the data input and therefore costs for the on-board computer would be shared 
with sensor inputs from the dynamic system, flight controls, stability augmentation systems, 
and data that would be helpful in crash investigations. Preliminary cost estimates indicate 
that a user cost of $10,000 per aircraft for a complete system should.be achievable with a 
weight penalty of 20 pounds. Such a system would not only greatly reduce accident potential 
but offer substantial savings in maintenance fault analysis and reduced repetitive maintenance 
throughout the aircraft. Estimated nonrecurring costs are: 
a 	 Lightweight on-board diagnostics package (engine $250,000 18 months 
portion only) 
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5.1.4 Improved in-flight restar'zcapability has-been listed as an R&D need because 
current turbine engines have airstart shortcomings. Technology for this is not wellunderstood; 
therefore it is recommended that an engine manufacturer be given a study contract-to de­
termine what could be done and the probable cost benefits. Estimated cost is: 
* 	 Studyimproved turbine-engine in-flight restart $100,000 12 months 
5.2 Tail Rotor Damage Tolerance
 
Several areas for improvement need R&D funding as discussed -below.,
 
5.2.1 A program is recommended to design and test improved fiberglass tail rotor blades 
to: (1) be capable of impacting a 1-inch-diam6ter hardwood dowel without damage; (2) be 
capable of losing a blade without tearing the tail rotor gearbox out of the aircraft;, or (3) 
possibly providing a shear pin to let the blade pivot to prevent loss in case of'impact. The 
program would include design, analysis, and impact testing of several concepts to determine 
the best means to combat the tail rotor damage problems. A full-scale tail rotor assembly 
would be instrumented to measure impact loads and gearbox mounting loads under blade loss 
conditions. Estimated cost for this program is: 
o 	 Tail rotor impact testing $300,000 18 months 
5;2.2 A tail rotor blade guard to protect agakrst strikes on objects and wires and to pro­
tect personnel is-required. Helicopters vary from no guards to half rings to full rings. Design 
criteria-must be established to reduce this hazard and should be combined ih the blade 
impact program defined in 5.2.1 and wire strike protection in 5.3.1. Estimated cost of this 
study is: 
* 	 Tail rotor guard design criteria $50,000 18 months 
5.3 'Design and Test Wire Cutters, Deflectors, and Detectors 
5.3.1 The recommended program is to develop wire cutters, deflectors, and structural 
reinforcements through analyses, design, and wire strike testing as follows: 
1. 	 Review wire strike accidents and designs of cutters and deflectors. 
2. 	 Analyze-typical helicopter types for dynamic response when impacting-various sizes 
and numbers of wires. 
3. 	 Design concepts to provide structural guards, wire deflectors, or wire cutzers as appropri­
ate. Typical areas that must be considered are windshields, hub and upper controls, 
rotor blades, landing gear, antennas, and tail rotor. 
4. 	 Fabricate test hardware and devise a test setup to simu)ate wire strikes and prove the 
best concepts. A scrapped helicopter could be used for this testing. 
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Estimated-cost is: 
* 	 Design/test wire cutters/deflectors $400,000 .18 months 
5.3.2 Wire detector research has been conducted at U.S..Army ECOM for several years
 
and at present has not been developed to a practical production model. Continuing R&D is
 
needed. Estimated costs to determine what needs to be done are:
 
* 	 Study to define needs $15,000 4 months 
5.4 Analyze Small Versus Large Operator Accidents and Types of Flying 
Figure 9 indicates the relative hazards of various types of flying but it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from the present state of the analysis. Therefore, it is recommended that further 
studies be conducted to determine why the statistics are as they are and what operational 
practices are affecting both bad and good accident rates. Rate trends should be studied for 
the past 8 years by kinds of flying, type of helicopters being flown, reciprocating or turbine 
engines, size of the operation, standard operating procedures, type of pilot training and ex­
perience level, and other factors that may be influencing the rates. It is anticipated that this 
study would reveal several areas for improving safety in addition to those contained herein. 
Estimated cost is: 
* 	 Analyze small versus large helicopter operators $50,000 10 months 
versus.kinds of flying 
5.5 Stability and Control Design Criteria (VFR/IFR/Autorotation) 
Helicopter types have a large variation in rotor inertia and stability and control charac­
teristics. Some are easy to fly and others are hazardous, particularly when entering marginal 
conditions such as power-off emergency or practice landings or power-on landings, takeoffs, 
and hover maneuvering in adverse winds, at high gross weights, or at high/hot conditions. Pilot 
error is often cited as the primary cause or a contributing cause of accidents under these con­
ditions. The question is whether or not the average pilot is given a machine that is safe when 
pushed to the limits of his capability. Design criteria need to be examined in light of the 
trend toward more IFR flying and increased use of helicopters in the borderline operations 
with marginally experienced pilots. Estimated cost for this program is: 
* 	 Study stability and control criteria and $100,000 12 months 
requirements (VFR/IFR/autorotation) 
5.6 Cockpit Layout, Visibility, Workload, and Crash Survivability 
Cockpit and instrument dayouts will need attention to minimize pilot workload, improve 
instrument presentations, and reduce glare, rotor flicker, anticollision light reflections, and 
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other phenomena that cause disorientation. An improved low-airspeed system is discussed in 
paragraph 5.9. 
A system analysis approach addressing civil operations should be initiated to provide 
criteria for improved cockpit design and reduced pilot workload. Better definition of civil 
operating parameters is needed. Analysis of historical data, evaluation of present usage, and 
prediction of future utility should be included in such astudy. Further classification of heli­
copter type capability is necessary to assure that each design is properly certified to a more 
definitive operating category. 
The program would involve mockups to assist in pilot evaluations of improved cockpit 
environment and advanced systems monitoring concepts. 
With improved cockpits it is also nebessary to consider the crash safety problems of de­
lethalization of the interior and energy-absorbing seat stroking requirements. There should 
also be a consideration of pilot comfort and how to combat the high-temperature, high­
humidity fatigue problem. Estimated cost of this study program is: 
a 	 Cockpit layout/visibility/workload/ $250,000 18 months 
crash survivability' 
5.7 Dynamic System Diagnostics and Incipient Failure Detection (IFD) 
For dynamic systems positive airborne incipient failure detection (IFD) is needed to 
prevent accidents (reference 5). IFD can be applied to any rotating machinery and can detect 
impending failure of gears and bearings. Application would include the main transmission, 
intermediate gearbox, tail rotor gearbox, swashplate bearing, and tail rotor drive shaft hanger 
bearings. The capability of this equipment in laboratory applications has been demonstrated. 
The program recommended here is as follows: 
1. 	 Conduct spali failure progression testing of bearings. 
2. 	 Develop lightweight airborne monitoring equipment using the IFD demodulated 
resonance principle. 
3. 	 Conduct implant testing of failed components in gear test stands. Adjust thresholds 
and conduct false warning testing. 
4. 	 Demonstrate reliability in test helicopters. 
5. 	 Define how to combine with other diagnostic equipment in the on-board computer box 
discussed in paragraph 5.1.3. 
Estimated cost of this program is: 
m 	 Dynamic systems airborne IjFD $200,000 18 months 
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5.8 Energy-Absorbing Crew and Passenger Seating 
Current NASA contracts are in process to define fixed-wing aircraft seat configurations. 
Follow-on design, fabrication, and dynamic testing of several seat configurations for helicopter 
application are required to complete development. Estimated cost is: 
* 	 Energy-absorbing crew and passenger seat $200,000 18 months 
development testing ­
5.9 Study Reciprocating-Engine Failures 
As discussed earlier, reciprocating engines fail because of improper operations such as 
overspeed on starting, improper fuel, fuel contamination, improper mixture control, running 
out of oil, and improper assembly and maintenance practices. A detailed analysis of all types 
of engines and causes for failure is beyond the scope of this study. Since reciprocating engines 
will continue to be used in helicopters in the foreseeable future and failures of reciprocating 
engines will continue to cause high accident rates, a high priority,must-be assigned to failure 
prevention. A survey of operators and engine manufacturers and a detailed study of NTSB 
accident records and FAA M or D reports for the past 7 years is recommended. Estimated 
cost is: 
* 	 Study reciprocating-engine failures $50,000 10 months 
5.10 Develop Omnidirectional Airspeed System and Improve Existing System Accuracy 
There is a definite need for an accurate omnidirectional low-airspeed system for heli­
copters. Many systems have been evaluated over the years in helicopter flight testing with 
limited success. One system, the Low-Range Omnidirectional Airspeed System (LORAS), has 
demonstrated that it will do the job but needs further research to make it suitable for low­
cost production. 
Existing airspeed systems must also be improved in flight modes suchas autorotation and 
low-speed high rate of climb where substantial errors are introduced because of directional 
changes in airflow and errors from pitot tube location. At present, there is no requirement 
for calibration of the airspeed system under the unusual flight modes. A study of this problem 
to assess what could be done is recommended. Estimated cost for such a study is: 
o 	 Study low-airspeed systems and improve $15,000 4 months 
existing systems 
5.11 Develop Advanced Systems Monitor 
It is recommended that a design and analysis program be conducted to include concept 
formulation, selection, and evaluation of an Advanced Systems Monitor (ASM) to reduce crew 
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workload and eliminate numerous subsystem instruments. The concepts identified-shall be 
capable of practical application'toward existing and.future helicopters.. Additional details 
are discussed in paragraph 4.2.20. Estimated cost is: 
* Define ASM needs and cost benefits "$80,000 12 months 
5.12 Develop an Autorotation Simulator 
It is recommended that a study and design analysis be conducted to-define an autorotation 
simulator for pilot training and proficiency checks. The simulator would be capable of repro­
ducing various helicopter characteristics and the hazards-involved in a power-off approach and 
landing. This study would compare and relate similar requirements for civil operations tc 
those incorporated in CH-47 and UH-i simulators now in use by the U.S. Army at Fort Rucker, 
Alabama. 
a Study needs and define simulator requirements $50,000 10 months 
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6.0 IMPACT OF SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS ON SIZE,
 
CONFIGURATION, AND MISSION APPLICABILITY
 
Table 14 is a summary of the research and development recommended for increased
 
safety, including an estimation of the impact on size, configuration, and mission applicability.
 
TABLE 14. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED R&D FOR INCREASED SAFETY
 
No. 	 Research Item or Area 
1. 	 Turbine engine reliability/ 

contingency power diagnostics
 
2. 	 Tafrotor damage tolerance 
3. 	 Design/test wire cutters, 

deflectors, and detectors
 
4. 	 Analyze small versus large operator 

accidents (kinds of flying)
 
5. 	 Stability and control design criteria 

(VFR/IFR/autorotation)
 
6. 	 Cockpit layout/visibility/workload/ 

crash survivability
 
7. 	 Dynamic system diagnostic incipient 
failure detection (IFD) 
8. 	 Energy-absorbing crew and passenger 
seating 
9. 	 Study reciprocating engine failures 

to determine what R&D needs are 

10. 	 Develop omnidirectional low-airspeed 
system and improve system for autoro­
tation and low-speed high rate of climb 
11. 	 Develop advanced systems monitor 
for reduced pilot workload 
12. 	 Develop an autorotation simulator 
Priority 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
High 
Size 
Applicability Payoff 
All High 
All High 
All High 
All High -
All High 
All High 
All High 
All High 
Small, under High 
5,000 lb 
All High 
All High 
Small, High 
medium 
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7.0 IMPACT OF SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS. ON LIFE-CYCLE 
COSTS AND INTERACTING TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS 
The costs of a high accident rate in civil helicopters are generally reflected in high hull 
insurance rates, which are discussed below. Other associated costs of accidents such as loss of 
revenue, costs of delays, investigations, and lack-of public confidence in helicopters are sub­
stantial and have the effect of depressing helicopter industry growth. Therefore, effort spent 
in continuing the downtrend in accident rate can be traded for lower operating costs and in­
creased demand for services. A good safety record is mandatory for continued growth and 
maturity in the civil helicopter marketplace. 
Accident Rate Trends and Insurance 
As shown in Figure 1, the accident rates for 1969 through 1976 are decreasing for both 
rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft in general aviation. The fact that helicopter accident rates 
are approximately 1.6 times the fixed-wing aircraft rate as shown in Figure 4 las a direct 
effect on hull insurance rates. The opinion of insurance underwriters, brokers, and claims 
adjusters is that the current rates of rotary-wing hull insurance are now too low and a down­
ward trend in accidents must continue for hull insurance to remain at present levels. Note 
that hull insurance rates vary with type of helicopter, type of operation, accident record of 
aircraft and operator, pilot experience, availability of repair parts, and fleet size. For example, 
for a helicopter that has a good record with replacement parts readily available in a large fleet 
used for corporate air taxi with well-trained, experienced pilots with good records, the hull 
insurance rate can be as low as 4 percent of the selling price per year. Conversely, factors 
that increase the probability of accidents such as crop dusting with a small, poorly maintained 
fleet and poorly trained pilots with low flying hours, can push the rate as highas 20 percent 
and, in some cases, no one wants to insure the operator. This leads to the conclusion that the 
most effective methods for preventing accidents today are better operations and planning and 
better pilot and maintenance crew training, i.e., more profesionaism. However, in the long 
riu, many other actions must be taken to effect a 62-percent reduction in the accident rate 
by 1985. These are discussed elsewhere in this report. 
The safety record for civil helicopters is reflected in part-by the insurance rates. The hull 
insurance rate has decreased from about 15 to 20 percent in 1969 to 4 to 8 percent in 1977. 
This reduction was brought about by the following: 
* 	 A reduction in U.S. civil helicopter accident rates from 41/100,000 flying hours in 
1968 to 16/100,000 flying hours in 1976. 
* 	 Entry of U.S. insurance companies into the market offering lower rates than those in 
the U.K. consortium. At present about 25 percent of the helicopter insurance is 
written by five U.S. companies. 
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* 	 Increased professionalism among operators, maintenance personnel, and pilots which 
promotes safer operations. 
" 	 Increase in use of turbine-powered helicopters. 
o 	 Greater use of twin-turbine-powered helicopters. 
* 	 Increase in fleet size and better scheduling and planning. 
In general, when a helicopter has a hard landing or uncontrolled touchdown in either 
normal operation or in an emergency situation, it frequently rolls over and disintegrates because 
of the energy in the whirling rotor blades. The result is major damage which may be beyond 
repair. A similar situation in a fixed-wing aircraft usually results in much less damage that is 
quickly repairable. The impact on hull insurance rates is that the helicopter rate may be 
several times that of the fixed-wing aircraft in similar operations (air taxi, for example), even 
though the accident rates may only be slightly higher for the helicopters. 
Liability insurance has remained about the same as for fixed-wing aircraft in equivalent 
operations in spite of the higher accident rate of helicopters. This reflects the fact that fewer 
people are killed or injured in helicopter accidents than in fixed-wing aircraft because helicop­
ters are as survivable as fixed-wing aircraft in major crashes and fewer people are carried in 
helicopters. The fatal accident rates of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are approximately 
the same at two per 100,000 flying hours. Even though minor accidents in helicopters fre­
quently result in major hull damage, the crew and passengers may not be severely injured 
because they are located near the center of rotation of the blades, and centrifugal force 
throws parts outward away from occupants. 
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8.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
- The limited analysis of accident statistics and causal factors, operator surveys, and 
response from operator questionnaires conducted in this study has shown that there are many 
areas for work in reducing accidents-in civil helicokters. Twenty-one areas that are within 
existing technology and,therefore are available for immediate action are summarized below: 
1. 	 Phase out older aircraft and go to single and twin turbines with better power match. 
2. 	 Improve reliability-of reciprocating and turbine engines with an aggressive failure
 
analysis and fix program with engine manufacturers.
 
3. 	 Install fuel filters in fuel truck hoses near nozzle to prevent engine failures caused by
 
fuel contamination and water in fuel.
 
4. 	 On twin-engine helicopters, provide failed engine warning so good engine -will not be
 
shut down. On single-engine helicopters, provide failed engine warning so that pilots
 
will not be surprised when making descents-to find,no power on descent termination.
 
5. 	 Improve operational planning and fuel gage accuracy and provide 5-minute fuel
 
warning to prevent fuel exhaustion.
 
6. -Train pilots to understand helicopter low-speed aerodynamics for high jross weights-and
 
autorotation, combined with improved low-airspeed indication (see item 13 under
 
R&D below).
 
7. 	 Improve practice autorotation and pilot qualifications for autorotation and improve
 
aircraft stability and control.
 
8. 	 Install power-remaining indicators in all helicopters. 
9. 	 Improve operational planning, have good debriefings. avoid letting missions become
 
routine, and reduce complacency.
 
10. 	 Train pilots in wire-avoidance techniques and provide IFR capability in helicopters to 
reduce flying in wire environments. 
11. 	 Reduce pilot complacency in maneuvers close to obstacles. 
12. 	 Improve pilot awareness of adverse terrain factors and aircraft capabilities in adverse winds. 
13. 	 Install limited IFR instruments, and sufficient helicopter stability to Use them, and train 
pilots in their use. 
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14. 	 Improve metal main rotor blade corrosion-control, blade fatigue crack inspection, and 
blade retention assurance. 
15. 	 Retrofit composite main rotor blades. 
16. 	 Install positive-retention bolts in critical flight controls. 
17. 	 Improve quality control of tail rotor gearboxes. 
18. 	 Retrofit crashworthy fuel systems and design into new helicopters. 
19. 	 Improve crashworthy structure concepts in all new helicopter designs. 
20. 	 Provide pilots with lightweight crash helmets. 
21. 	 Improve maintenance to keep pitot-static system drained and clear for accurate airspeed 
indication. 
The following additional areas for safety improvement are recommended for R&D 
funding: 
1. Specific turbine-engine reliability improvements (ref. 3). 
2. Develop a lightweight, low-cost turbine-engine health-monitoring system. 
3. Engine contingency power by wet and dry augmentation (ref. 4). 
4. Improve turbine-engine in-flight restart capability. 
5. Improve tail rotor damage tolerance and develop tail rotor guard design criteria. 
6. Design and test wire cutters and deflectors and develop wire detectors. 
7. Analyze small versus large operator accidents and kinds of flying. 
8. Review stability and control design criteria (VFR/IFR/autorotation). 
9. Cockpit layout/visibility/workload/crash survivability - study and mockups. 
10. 	 Dynamic systems airborne incipient failure detection (IFD) (ref. 5). 
11. 	 Energy-absorbing crew and passenger seating development and testing. 
12. 	 Study reciprocating-engine helicopters, engines, and related drive system components to 
determine where research is required to prevent engine failures. 
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13. 	 Improve airspeed systems for accurate omnidirectionallow-airspeed indicatibn and
 
develop improved accuracy for autorotation and low-spbed high rate of climb.
 
-14. 	 Develop Advanced Sistems Monitoring to combihe engine health:(power available), 
systbmsstatus, failure warning devices, and improved cockpitpresentation for greatly 
reduced pilot workl6ad., 
15. 	 Develop an autorotation simulator. 
Action on most of these recommendations will be necessary to achieve the goal of less 
than 6.0 accidents/100,000 flying hours and less than 0.9 fatal accident/l00,000.for the U.S. 
civil-helicopter fleet by 1985. The cost of a bad accident record in restraining growth of the 
helicopter-industry and losses of equipment andlives far outweighs the cost of an aggressive 
safety campaign. 
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